

Supreme Court, U. S.

FILED

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MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1975

No. **75-1096**

LOCAL UNION No. 81 a/w Amalgamated Meat Cutters
and Butcher Workmen of North America, AFL-CIO

Petitioner,

v.

ALLIED EMPLOYERS, INC.; SAFEWAY STORES, INC.; EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION; NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD; STATE OF WASHINGTON, HUMAN
RIGHTS COMMISSION; CITY OF SEATTLE, OFFICE OF
WOMEN'S RIGHTS,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
To the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit

HUGH HAFFER

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IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1975

No.

LOCAL UNION No. 81 a/w Amalgamated Meat Cutters
and Butcher Workmen of North America, AFL-CIO
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ALLIED EMPLOYERS, INC.; SAFEWAY STORES, INC.; EQUAL
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RIGHTS COMMISSION; CITY OF SEATTLE, OFFICE OF
WOMEN'S RIGHTS,
Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
To the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit

Petitioner prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgments entered by two judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on November 12, 1975 (*infra*, pg. 19) and December 22, 1975 (*infra*, pg. 18).

OPINIONS BELOW

The district court entered an order of summary judgment dismissing Petitioner's suit on April 11, 1975 (*infra*, pp. 14-15). Rehearing was requested. Following submis-

sions on rehearing the district court narrowed the scope of its ruling but on May 19, 1975 denied the request for rehearing (*infra*, pp. 16-17). Two judges of the Ninth Circuit entered a two sentence order affirming the district court's judgment (*infra*, pg. 19) and the same judges entered a one sentence order denying Petitioner's request for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc (*infra*, pg. 18). No opinions, reported or unreported, were issued.

JURISDICTION

The two judge court below entered an order of "summary affirmance" on November 12, 1975. The same two judge court denied Petitioner's request for rehearing and rejected Petitioner's suggestion of an en banc hearing on December 22, 1975. The jurisdiction of this Court rests on 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1254 (1).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether a court of appeals is authorized to affirm a district court judgment by action of a division consisting of less than three judges.
2. Whether a court of appeals is required to transmit a suggestion of rehearing en banc to the judges of the court who are in regular active service.
3. Whether a federal district court has jurisdiction to rule on the validity of a labor contract in a suit filed by a party to the contract where it is alleged, in duplicitous federal and state administrative proceedings, that such contract discriminates against female members of the bargaining unit. A related question is presented; namely, whether interested federal and state civil rights agencies can be joined as parties to the suit.

STATUTES AND RULES INVOLVED

The first question requires consideration of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 46(b), Rules 1 and 27(c) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure and Rule 6(e) of the Ninth Circuit. The second question involves 28 U.S.C. Sec. 46(c), Rules 1 and 35(b) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 12 of the Ninth Circuit is germane to the second question. The third question involves 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185 which concerns federal court jurisdiction over labor agreements. Both federal and state civil rights laws have a bearing on the third question presented by this petition. The relevant statutes and rules are set forth at pages 20-24, *infra*.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

(The Parties)

Petitioner, Local Union No. 81 a/w Amalgamated Meatcutters and Butcher Workmen of North America, AFI-CIO ("Local 81") is a labor organization and represents employees in retail meat markets located in the Seattle metropolitan area (R. 3). Respondent Allied Employers, Inc. ("Allied") represents a substantial number of retail employers in bargaining with Local 81 (R. 3). Respondent Safeway Stores, Inc. ("Safeway") owns and operates retail stores in the Seattle area. Safeway bargains separately with Local 81 (R. 3). Local 81's collective bargaining relationship with Allied, its member employers and Safeway affects commerce within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 141 *et seq.* ("N.L.R.A.") (R. 3).

Respondent Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("E.E.O.C.") is a federal agency which has respon-

sibilities with respect to the enforcement of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e *et seq.* ("Civil Rights Act"). Respondent National Labor Relations Board ("N.L.R.B.") is a federal agency which administers the N.L.R.A. The N.L.R.B. from time to time asserts jurisdiction over sex discrimination cases (R. 3).

The Respondent Washington Human Rights Commission is a state agency which administers a law prohibiting, *inter alia*, employment discrimination on account of sex (R. 4). Last but not least is Respondent Office of Women's Rights, an agency of the City of Seattle which enforces an ordinance prohibiting employment discrimination on account of sex (R. 4).

(The Background Events)

Local 81 concluded negotiations for a three year contract with Allied and Safeway in 1974 (R. 4). Substantially all of the market managers and meatcutters covered by the contract are men. Substantially all of the 650 meat wrappers covered by the contract are women (R. 3-4). A number of wrappers complained to Local 81 that the wage rate and cost of living articles of the contract discriminated against the meat wrappers (R. 4-5).

In December, 1974 the Respondent Office of Women's Rights issued a "Directors Charge" alleging that Local 81 discriminatorily negotiated "salary increase" and "cost of living" clauses in its contract (R. 42). A few weeks later Donna B. Castle, a member of the Local 81 bargaining unit, filed charges with the Respondent Washington Human Rights Commission. Ms. Castle alleged that Local 81 and her employer, a member of the Respondent Allied Bargain-

ing group, had forced her to quit because of her role in the issuance of the "Director's Charge" by the Office of Women's Rights (R. 50).

While charges were pending before the state human rights commission and the city Office of Women's Rights, Ms. Castle filed discrimination charges with the E.E.O.C. again alleging that Local 81's contract was discriminatory.¹ This charge was referred to the state commission which referred the charge back to the E.E.O.C. on April 15, 1975. The state commission retained jurisdiction over the retaliation charge (R. 132-133).

By early January, 1975 Local 81 divined that its contract was being attacked or about to be attacked in duplicitous city, state and federal agency proceedings. Local 81 filed suit in the district court against Allied and Safeway for the purpose of determining whether the contractual wage schedules and cost of living clauses discriminated against female members of the bargaining unit (R. 1-5). Local 81 joined as additional defendants the agencies which were in fact or apt to be interested in the dispute. By the time the case reached the motion state in the district court all of the Respondent agencies, except the N.L.R.B., had occasion to consider charges that the contract was discriminatory in structure. As of this date such charges are pending before Respondent E.E.O.C. and Respondent Office of Women's Rights of the City of Seattle.²

1. The E.E.O.C. has not served a copy of the charges on Local 81. Petitioner's information concerning the E.E.O.C. proceeding was obtained from an affidavit filed by counsel for the state commission during the proceedings in the district court (R. 132-133).

2. The Washington Human Rights Commission on January 19, 1976 issued findings exonerating Local 81 from any wrong relating to Ms. Castle's termination.

(The District Court and Its Orders)

Petitioner's complaint in the district court encountered a passel of dismissal motions which were granted (*infra*, pp. 14-15). Petitioner requested rehearing and indicated a willingness to join Ms. Castle whose charges had triggered the administrative proceedings (R. 135). In further response to the defenses urged in the district court, Petitioner expressly predicated its jurisdictional claim upon Section 301 of the N.L.R.A. (R. 128; *infra*, pp. 22-23). The district court, apparently satisfied with its statutory authority and the parties actually or potentially before the court, denied rehearing on the single ground that a case or controversy (in the constitutional sense) was not presented (*infra*, pp. 16-17).

(The Court of Appeals and Its Orders)

After Petitioner's appeal was docketed in the court below, Respondent E.E.O.C. and N.L.R.B. filed motions for summary affirmance. These motions were granted in a two sentence order by a two judge court (*infra*, pg. 19). Petitioner moved for rehearing and filed a suggestion of rehearing en banc. Petitioner's motion for rehearing specifically raised the question of whether a two judge court was authorized to adjudicate a duly perfected appeal (Pet. for Rehearing, pg. 2). The two judge court which granted summary affirmance denied Petitioner's motion for rehearing and rejected Petitioner's suggestion of an en banc hearing, *infra*, pg. 18.

Petitioner was aware of prior cases in which two judge courts in the Ninth Circuit had rejected a suggestion of en banc hearing (*infra*, pg. 29). In an effort to ascertain

whether the practice in fact followed in the Ninth Circuit was in conformity with 28 U.S.C. Sec. 46 and Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, Petitioner directed a letter to the court below (*infra*, pg. 25) pursuant to Rule 1 of the local rules of the Ninth Circuit (*infra*, pp. 21-22). In response the Clerk of the Ninth Circuit wrote as follows (*infra*, pg. 26):

In accordance with a policy of this court, the decision to reject the suggestion for rehearing en banc was made by the motions panel as one not requiring consideration by all the active judges. See *Western Pacific Ry. Corp. v. Western Pacific Ry. Co.*, 345 U.S. 247, 257-259 (1952); 9 Moore's Federal Practice 4102, Advisory Committee note to rule 35.

The Clerk's letter avoids direct response to Petitioner's inquiry (*infra*, pg. 25) as to whether the petition for rehearing was in fact *transmitted* to the judges in the active regular service of the court. Given the tenor of the Clerk's response and the failure to answer the question properly before the court below, Petitioner can only conclude that the suggestion for en banc rehearing was not *transmitted* to the judges in the active regular service of the court.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. The Ninth Circuit's Practice of Summary Dismissal and Affirmance of Appeals by Two Judge Courts Is in Conflict With 28 U.S.C. Sec. 46 and Calls for the Exercise of This Court's Power of Supervision

In this case (*infra*, pp. 18-19) and in other recent cases before the Ninth Circuit (*infra*, pp. 27-29) dispositive orders have been issued by two judge courts. This practice is in direct conflict with 46 U.S.C. Sec. 46(b):

In each circuit the court may authorize the hearing

and determination of cases and controversies by separate divisions, each consisting of three judges. (*infra*, pg. 20)

The words "consisting of three judges" do not suggest lurking ambiguity.

The Rules of Appellate Procedure adopted in 1966 "govern procedure in appeals to United States Court of Appeals . . ." (Rule 1, *infra*, pg. 20). The Courts of Appeal "may . . . make . . . rules not inconsistent with" the Rules of Appellate Procedure (Rule 47, *infra*, pg. 21). Rule 27(c) implicitly restates the three judge requirement of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 46(b) by prohibiting a single judge from dismissing or otherwise determining an appeal (*infra*, pg. 21).

The local rules of the Ninth Circuit as amended January 22, 1974 adopt the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure (*infra*, pg. 22) and expressly recognize the three judge court tradition embodied in 28 U.S.C. Sec. 46 and Rule 27 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Local rule 6(e) provides (*infra*, pg. 22):

Single Judge may Summon Assistance When any motion or petition is properly addressed to a single judge of the court, he may summon two other judges of the court and the three together may hear and determine the motion or petition.

The applicable statute, the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and the local rules of the Ninth Circuit contemplate a three judge court. In the case at bar (*infra*, pp. 18-19) and in other recent cases (*infra*, pp. 27-29) the court below inexplicably ignored the requirement of a three judge court. Petitioner suggests that the exercise of the "power of supervision" is appropriate.

II. The Ninth Circuit's Policy of Transmitting Suggestions for En Banc Rehearing Only to Members of the Panel Which Initially Heard the Case Is in Conflict With Rule 35(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and Calls for the Exercise of This Court's Power of Supervision

In the Ninth Circuit suggestions for rehearing en banc are transmitted only to the panel which originally decided the case (*infra*, pg. 26). Prior to 1966 such practice was sanctioned by the decisions of this Court³ and the local rules of the Ninth Circuit.⁴ Today it is sanctioned by neither. *Cf. Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co.*, 417 U.S. 622 note 2 (1974).⁵

The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure established rules applicable to all circuits (Rule 1, *infra*, pg. 20). Rule 35(b) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure expressly provides, with respect to suggestions for rehearing en banc, that the "clerk *shall transmit* any such suggestion to the judges of the court who are in regular active service . . ." (*infra*, pg. 21). Although the Ninth Circuit's local rule 12 (*infra*, pg. 22) adopts Rule 35 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, it is apparent that the Ninth Circuit in fact does not follow the mandate of Rule 35(b). (*Infra*, pg. 26).

"The en banc power . . . is . . . a necessary and useful power—indeed too useful that we should ever permit a court to ignore the possibilities of its use in cases where its use might be appropriate." *Western Pacific Railroad*

3. *Western Pacific Railroad Case*, 345 U.S. 247, 250 (1953); *Shenker v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co.*, 374 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1963).

4. *Bradley Mining Co. v. Boice*, 205 F.2d 937, 938 (9th Cir. 1953).

5. The *Moody* opinion does not address itself to the transmittal requirement of Rule 35(b).

Case, 345 U.S. 247, 260 (1953). If all of the judges in the active regular service of the Ninth Circuit had *received* a copy of the petition for rehearing and suggestion of en banc hearing it is unlikely that Petitioner's challenge to the two judge courts of the circuit would have been rejected out of hand.

The court below, as a matter of "policy," does not *transmit* suggestions for rehearing en banc to the judges of the court who are in regular active service (*infra*, pg. 26). Such *transmittal* is required by Rule 35(b) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Hence, this Court should exercise its power of supervision.

III. The Authority of a Federal District Court to Resolve in a Unitary Proceeding Questions Concerning the Structural Integrity of a Collective Bargaining Agreement *Vis a Vis* Claims of Sex Discrimination Is Squarely Presented By This Petition and Because of the Importance of This Unresolved Question of Federal Law Certiorari Should Be Granted

Statutory jurisdiction (Section 301 of the N.L.R.A., 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185) in the district court to rule upon the structural validity of a collective bargaining agreement which allegedly contravenes federal civil rights laws⁶ or valid state laws⁷ has been expressly sustained by the Third and Fifth Circuits. The contrary decision below is in direct conflict with decisions of the Third and Fifth Circuits.

The authority to join as parties the interested governmental agencies should not be seriously disputed in view of the E.E.O.C.'s petition for certioari in the *Jersey Cen-*

6. *Jersey Central Power v. IBEW*, 508 F.2d 687, 698-699 (3rd Cir. 1975) cert. pending, docket 75-182.

7. *Mobil Oil Corp. v. Oil Workers*, 504 F.2d 272, 273 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. granted Oct. 6, 1975 docket 74-1254.

tral case pending before this Court. With respect to *Jersey Central*—a Section 301 suit by an employer against a union in which the E.E.O.C. was joined—the Solicitor General has said (Memorandum For the United States As Amicus Curiae, Case No. 75-182, pp. 4-5 note 2):⁸

EEOC, however, is undoubtedly a proper party to this case with respect to the contractual issues raised by *Jersey Centarl's* complaint, and its status as a party probably means that it will be bound by the judgment as a matter of *res judicata*. See ALI, *Restatement of Judgments*, § 77 (1942). And see Pet. App. 62.

At this juncture it does not appear that the Respondent N.L.R.B. or the Respondent Washington Human Rights Commission have taken or are likely to take an interest in the allegedly discriminatory structure of the Local 81 agreement. Accordingly, Petitioner does not controvert the finding below that no case or controversy exists insofar as those two agencies are concerned. However, active cases involving the structural integrity of Petitioner's labor agreement have been and are pending before Respondent E.E.O.C. and Respondent Office of Women's Rights. These cases presented and present a genuine, clear and imminent danger to Petitioner. *Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody*, 422 U.S. 405, 419-422 (1975).⁹

The practical civil rights litigation problems facing labor and management are unmanageable. An arbitra-

8. See also: *Southbridge Plastics Div. v. Local 759*, — F. Supp. —, 11 BNA FEP Cases 703 (N.D. Miss. 1975)—EEOC joined as a party in a suit filed by employer against union. EEOC successfully overcame jurisdictional defenses asserted by union against EEOC's cross claim.

9. Perhaps the EEOC and the Office of Women's Rights will conclude their activities during the pendency of this case. Such an event would not moot the case. *Super Tire Engineering Co. v. McCorkle*, 416 U.S. 115, 125-126 (1974).

tion award does not bind a civil rights claimant. *Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.*, 415 U.S. 36 (1975). Separate and independent claims are created by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981. *Johnson v. Railway Express Co.*, 44 L.Ed.2d 295 (1975). A judgment in a "fair representation" case does not bar a "civil rights" suit.¹⁰ Similarly the successful defense of state discrimination charges does not bar proceedings under the Civil Rights Act of 1964¹¹ or 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981.¹² Nor does a court approved settlement of a private suit under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 bar an E.E.O.C. suit based upon the same charges.¹³

Given the doctrine of non-finality which has evolved in civil rights cases, union and employers cannot afford to sit idly by while class action back pay and damage liability accrues. Where, as here, the structural integrity of the contract is under attack a declaratory judgment proceeding, bottomed upon Section 301 of the N.L.R.A., 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185, is the only practical device available. If the contract is found to be faulty it can be renegotiated. If it is found to be valid the union and employer have some assurance that the agreement is in fact free from fault. Absent the availability of the procedure invoked by Petitioner, labor and management must await the outcome of non-binding administrative determinations. By the time such determinations are tested in the courts the contract will

10. *Stevenson v. Int'l. Paper Co.*, 516 F.2d 103, 108-111 (5th Cir. 1975).

11. *Batiste v. Furnco Corp.*, 503 F.2d 447, 550 (7th Cir. 1974).

12. *Wageed v. Schenit Industries*, — F. Supp. —, 11 BNA FEP Cases 1226 (D. Md. 1975).

13. *E.E.O.C. v. Kimberly Clark Corp.*, 511 F.2d 1352, 1361-1363 (6th Cir. 1975).

have expired. Any efforts to correct an expired agreement will be more than a day late and a dollar short.

Whether Section 301 of the N.L.R.A. will support a suit for declaratory judgment where, as here, the labor contract is being attacked before federal and state civil rights agencies is a question of national concern which should be decided by this Court.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this petition for writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

HUGH HAFFER
Counsel for Petitioner

APPENDIX A
ORDERS OF THE COURTS BELOW
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
 AT SEATTLE

LOCAL UNION NO. 81, a/w
 Amalgamated Meat Cutters and
 Butcher Workmen of North America,
 AFL-CIO (referred to as "Local 81"),
Plaintiff,

v.

ALLIED EMPLOYERS, INC.
 (referred to as "Allied");
 SAFEWAY STORES, INC.
 (referred to as "Safeway"),
 et al.,

Defendants.

No. C75-15S

ORDER ON
 DEFENDANTS'
 MOTIONS TO
 DISMISS

FILED IN THE
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
 Western District of Washington
 APRIL 11, 1975
 EDGAR SCOFIELD, *Clerk*

By, *Deputy*

After considering the arguments made by counsel in their briefs and at oral argument, the Court GRANTS the motions of the several defendants to dismiss because of the failure of subject matter jurisdiction to attach.

(1) As to Allied Employers, Inc. and Safeway Stores, there currently exists no justiciable case or controversy with plaintiff.

(2) A proper federal question for purposes of jurisdic-

tion under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1337 as to the National Labor Relations Board and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is not framed by the complaint. The complaint asks for a declaration of plaintiff's rights and liabilities under a collective bargaining agreement. Any potential federal question under the Enabling Acts applicable to these agencies would arise only by way of anticipation or avoidance of defenses by the agencies.

(3) Pendent jurisdiction over the Office of Women's Rights and the Human Rights Commission fails because no party properly before the Court exists to which these claims could be appended. Further, the Ninth Circuit does not recognize pendent parties. *Hymer v. Chai*, 407 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1969).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Judgment is to be entered accordingly.

The Clerk of this Court is instructed to send uncertified copies of this Order to all counsel of record.

DATED at Seattle, Washington, this 11th day of April, 1975.

/s/

United States District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

LOCAL UNION No. 81, a/w
Amalgamated Meat Cutters and
Butcher Workmen of North
America, AFL-CIO
(referred to as "Local 81"),
Plaintiff,
v.
ALLIED EMPLOYERS, INC.
(referred to as "Allied");
SAFEWAY STORES, INC.
(referred to as "Safeway"),
et al.,
Defendants.

No. C75-15S

ORDER
DENYING
MOTION FOR
RECONSID-
ERATION

FILED IN THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
Western District of Washington
MAY 19, 1975

EDGAR SCOFIELD, *Clerk*By, *Deputy*

With the concurrence of the employers who were named defendants in this action, plaintiff Union seeks to join a woman employee covered by the collective bargaining agreement in question and to have the Court determine the parties' respective rights and liabilities under that agreement in light of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Jurisdiction is premised upon 29 U.S.C.A. § 185. To show that there is a Constitutional case or controversy, it is alleged that the woman plaintiff seeks to join has instituted complaints with local, state and federal agencies charged with administering fair employment laws.

Assuming joinder of the additional party, this Court finds that the purported contract dispute is still too hypothetical and abstract to satisfy the case and controversy requirement of Article III of the Constitution.

The motion to reconsider the Order of April 11, 1975, is therefore DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

The Clerk of this Court is instructed to send uncertified copies of this Order to all counsel of record.

DATED at Seattle, Washington, this 19th day of May, 1975.

/s/

United States District Judge

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LOCAL UNION No. 81, a/w
AMALGAMATED MEAT CUTTERS AND
BUTCHER WORKMEN OF NORTH
AMERICA, AFL-CIO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.

ALLIED EMPLOYERS, INC., et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.

No. 75-2608
ORDER

FILED
DEC. 22, 1975
EMIL E. MELFI, JR.
Clerk, U. S. Court of Appeals

Before: CHOY and WALLACE, Circuit Judges.

Appellant's motion for rehearing is denied and its suggestion for rehearing en banc is rejected.

/s/

/s/

United States Circuit Judges

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

AMALGAMATED MEAT CUTTERS,
LOCAL 81,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.

ALLIED EMPLOYERS, INC., et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.

No. 75-2608
ORDER

FILED
NOV. 12, 1975
EMIL E. MELFI, JR., Clerk
U. S. COURT OF APPEALS

Before: CHOY and WALLACE, Circuit Judges.

Upon due consideration of the motions to dismiss or for summary affirmance, the district court's orders of April 11, 1975 and May 19, 1975 are hereby affirmed. The motion to defer filing of brief is denied as moot.

/s/

/s/

United States Circuit Judges

APPENDIX B
STATUTES AND RULES

28 U.S.C. Sec. 46:

§ 46. Assignment of judges; divisions; hearings; quorum

(a) Circuit judges shall sit on the court and its divisions in such order and at such times as the court directs.

(b) In each circuit the court may authorize the hearing and determination of cases and controversies by separate divisions, each consisting of three judges. Such divisions shall sit at the times and places and hear the cases and controversies assigned as the court directs.

(c) Cases and controversies shall be heard and determined by a court or division of not more than three judges, unless a hearing or rehearing before the court in banc is ordered by a majority of the circuit judges of the circuit who are in regular active service. A court in banc shall consist of all circuit judges in regular active service. A circuit judge of the circuit who has retired from regular active service shall also be competent to sit as a judge of the court in banc in the rehearing of a case or controversy if he sat in the court or division at the original hearing thereof.

(d) A majority of the number of judges authorized to constitute a court or division thereof, as provided in paragraph (c), shall constitute a quorum.

Rules of Appellate Procedure

Rule 1

(a) *Scope of Rules.* These rules govern procedure in appeals to United States courts of appeals from the United States district courts and the Tax Court of the United States; in proceedings in the courts of appeals for review or enforcement of orders of administrative agencies, boards, commissions and officers of the United States; and in applications for writs or other relief which a court of appeals or a judge thereof is competent to give.

(b) *Rules Not to Affect Jurisdiction.* These rules shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the court's of appeals as established by law.

Rule 27(c)

(c) *Power of a Single Judge to Entertain Motions.* In addition to the authority expressly conferred by these rules or by law, a single judge of a court of appeals may entertain and may grant or deny any request for relief which under these rules may properly be sought by motion, except that a single judge may not dismiss or otherwise determine an appeal or other proceeding, and except that a court of appeals may provide by order or rule that any motion or class of motions must be acted upon by the court. The action of a single judge may be reviewed by the court.

Rule 35(b)

(b) *Suggestion of a Party for Hearing or Rehearing in Banc.* A Party may suggest the appropriateness of a hearing or rehearing in banc. The clerk shall transmit any such suggestion to the judges of the court who are in regular active service but a vote will not be taken to determine whether the cause shall be heard or reheard en banc unless a judge in regular active service or a judge who was a member of the panel that rendered a decision sought to be reheard requests a vote on such a suggestion made by a party.

Rule 47

Each court of appeals by action of a majority of the circuit judges in regular active service from time to time make and amend rules governing its practice not inconsistent with these rules. In all cases not provided for by rule, the courts of appeals may regulate their practice in any manner not inconsistent with these rules. Copies of all rules made by a court of appeals shall upon their promulgation be furnished to the Administrative Office of the United States Courts.

Rules of the Ninth Circuit

Rule 1

All communications to the court shall be addressed to the clerk at the United States Court of Appeals, Post Office Box 547, San Francisco, California, 94101. When it is intended that a communication come to the personal attention of a judge or judges, sufficient copies, not includ-

ing the original, shall be supplied to the clerk so that he can furnish a copy to each judge.

Rule 5

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, whenever relevant, are adopted as part of the rules of this court. In cases where the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and the Rules of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit are silent as to a particular matter of appellate practice, any relevant rule of the Supreme Court of the United States shall be applied.

Rule 6(e)

(e) *Single Judge may Summon Assistance.* When any motion or petition is properly addressed to a single judge of the court, he may summon two other judges of the court and three together may hear and determine the motion or petition.

Rule 12

Where a suggestion of the appropriateness of a rehearing in banc, made pursuant to Rule 35(b), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, is made as part of a petition for rehearing, a reference to such suggestion, as well as to the petition for rehearing, shall appear on the cover of the combined petition and suggestion, and unless this is done the court shall not be required to consider such suggestion.

Where a petition for rehearing contains a suggestion for a rehearing in banc, there should be filed, in addition to the original petition, twenty-four copies.

National Labor Relations Act, as amended, Section 301, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185

SEC. 301. (a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.

(b) Any labor organization which represents employees

in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act and any employer whose activities affect commerce as defined in this Act shall be bound by the acts of its agents. Any such labor organization may sue as an entity and in behalf of the employees whom it represents in the courts of the United States. Any money judgment against a labor organization in a district court of the United States shall be enforceable only against the organization as an entity and against its assets, and shall not be enforceable against any individual member or his assets.

(c) For the purposes of actions and proceedings by or against labor organizations in the district courts of the United States, district courts shall be deemed to have jurisdiction of a labor organization (1) in the district in which such organization maintains its principal offices, or (2) in any district in which its duly authorized officers or agents are engaged in representing or acting for employee members.

(d) The service of summons, subpoena, or other legal process of any court of the United States upon an officer or agent of a labor organization, in his capacity as such, shall constitute service upon the labor organization.

(e) For the purposes of this section, in determining whether any person is acting as an "agent" of another person so as to make such other person responsible for his acts, the question of whether the specific acts performed were actually authorized or subsequently ratified shall not be controlling.

Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, Sec. 704, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2:

Sec. 704. (a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment, for an employment agency or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including on-the-job training programs, to discriminate against any individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate against any member thereof or applicant for membership, because he has opposed any practice, made an unlawful employment practice by this title, or because

he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this title.

(b) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer, labor organization, employment agency or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including on-the-job training programs, to print or cause to be printed or published any notice or advertisement relating to employment by such an employer or membership in or any classification or referral for employment by such a labor organization, or relating to any classification or referral for employment by such employment agency, or relating to admission to, or employment in, any program established to provide apprenticeship or other training by such a joint labor-management committee indicating any preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination, based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin, except that such a notice or advertisement may indicate a preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination based on religion, sex or national origin when religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification for employment.

APPENDIX C
INQUIRY TO COURT BELOW; PRIOR
TWO JUDGE ORDERS IN THE
COURT BELOW

December 29, 1975

Clerk of Court
United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit
P.O. Box 547
San Francisco, California 94101

Re: *Meatcutters Local 81 v. Allied Employers, Inc.,*
et al. No. 75-2608

Dear Sir:

Pursuant to Rule 1 we wish to inquire of each of the Judges in regular active service whether:

1. Each in fact received a copy of our petition for rehearing and suggestion en banc; and
2. One or more requested a vote on such suggestion.

Copies of this letter—one for each of the Judges—are enclosed.

Very truly yours,
Hugh Hafer
Counsel for Appellant

HH:prs
Enc.

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

January 22, 1976

Hugh Hafer, Esquire
Hafer, Cassidy & Price
Attorneys at Law
Suite 400, 2701 First Avenue
Seattle, Washington 98121

Re: No. 75-2608, *Meatcutters Local 81 v. Allied Employers, Inc., et al.*

Dear Mr. Hafer:

In response to your letter of December 29, 1975, in reference to the above-captioned matter, please be advised as follows:

In accordance with a policy of this Court, the decision to reject the suggestion for rehearing en banc was made by the motions panel as one not requiring consideration by all the active judges. See *Western Pacific Ry. Corp. v. Western Pacific Ry. Co.*, 345 U.S. 247, 257-259 (1952); 9 Moore's Federal Practice 4102, Advisory Committee note to Rule 35.

Sincerely yours,
/s/ EMIL E. MELFI, JR.
Emil E. Melfi, Jr.
Clerk of Court

EEM:pn

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RICHARD W. HASBROUCK,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
SHEET METAL WORKERS LOCAL 232,
etc., et al.

No. 74-2673
No. 75-1577
O R D E R
Dismissing
Appeals

FILED
July 2, 1975
Emil E. Melfi, Jr.
Clerk
U.S. Court of
Appeals

Before: CHAMBERS and ELY, Circuit Judges.

Upon due consideration, the motions to dismiss are granted and these appeals are dismissed. Rule 54(b) Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Should the district court certify under Rule 54(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, its previous orders and should an appeal from such an order be promptly perfected, this Court will entertain a motion in the new appeal to hear said appeal on the basis of the record and briefs in these appeals, properly supplemented.

/s/ _____

/s/ _____
U.S. Circuit Judges

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SHIRLEY COMEAU, SHIRLEY GLENN
RICH, GEORGIA GRANT, DELORES LYDE,
JEANETTE SNOWDEN, DOROTHY
ANDERSON ALVORD, KATHLEEN BROWN,
JUDY GILL, LAURIE TRUJILLO, VALERIE
VIKE, JOHANNA ENDT and
TERI ANN SHARP,
Petitioners,

v.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT
OF WASHINGTON

Respondent.

PAY 'N SAVE CORPORATION,
Defendant and Real Party in Interest

No. 75-1588
O R D E R

FILED
March 31, 1975
Clerk
U.S. Court of
Appeals

Before: GOODWIN and WALLACE, Circuit Judges

Upon due consideration, petitioners' application for
a writ of mandamus or prohibition is denied.

/s/ ALFRED T. GOODWIN

/s/ J. CLIFFORD WALLACE

U.S. Circuit Judges

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SHIRLEY COMEAU, SHIRLEY GLENN
RICH, GEORGIA GRANT, DELORES LYDE,
JEANETTE SNOWDEN, DOROTHY
ANDERSON ALVORD, KATHLEEN BROWN,
JUDY GILL, LAURIE TRUJILLO, VALERIE
VIKE, JOHANNA ENDT and
TERI ANN SHARP,
Petitioners,

v.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT
OF WASHINGTON

Respondent,

PAY 'N SAVE CORPORATION,
*Defendant and Real
Party in Interest.*

No. 75-1588
O R D E R

FILED
May 23, 1975
Emil E. Melei, Jr.
Clerk
U.S. Court of
Appeals

Before: GOODWIN and WALLACE, Circuit Judges.

The petition for rehearing with suggestion for rehear-
ing en banc filed April 14, 1975, by the petitioners Shirley
Comeau, et al., is treated as a petition for reconsideration
and is Denied.

/s/ ALFRED T. GOODWIN

/s/ J. CLIFFORD WALLACE

U.S. Circuit Judges

MAR 3 1976

MICHAEL RUDAN, JR., CLERK

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1975
No. 75-1096

LOCAL UNION No. 81 a/w Amalgamated Meat Cutters
and Butcher Workmen of North America, AFL-CIO
Petitioner,

v.

ALLIED EMPLOYERS, INC.; SAFEWAY STORES, INC.,
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION;
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD;
STATE OF WASHINGTON, HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION;
CITY OF SEATTLE, OFFICE OF WOMEN'S RIGHTS,
Respondents.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Office and Post Office Address:	JOHN P. HARRIS
10th Floor	Corporation Counsel
Seattle Municipal Bldg.	<i>Attorney for Respondent</i>
Seattle, Washington 98104	<i>The City of Seattle</i>
Telephone: 206-583-2338	<i>Office of Women's Rights</i>

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**IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States**

**OCTOBER TERM, 1975
No. 75-1096**

**LOCAL UNION No. 81 a/w Amalgamated Meat Cutters
and Butcher Workmen of North America, AFL-CIO
*Petitioner,***

v.

**ALLIED EMPLOYERS, INC.; SAFEWAY STORES, INC.,
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION;
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD;
STATE OF WASHINGTON, HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION;
CITY OF SEATTLE, OFFICE OF WOMEN'S RIGHTS,
*Respondents.***

**BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI**

Respondent, The City of Seattle, Office of Women's Rights (hereinafter "Office of Women's Rights") submits this brief in opposition to the petition of Local Union No. 81 a/w Amalgamated Meatcutters and Butcher Workmen of North America, AFL-CIO for a writ of certiorari.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether a court of appeals is authorized to affirm a district court judgment by action of a division consisting of less than three judges.

2. Whether a court of appeals is required to transmit a suggestion of rehearing en banc to the judges of the court who are in regular active service.

3. Whether a federal district court has jurisdiction pursuant to Section 301 of the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. Sec. 185) to rule on the validity of a labor contract in a suit for declaratory judgment filed by a labor union against the employers and federal, state and local civil rights agencies where there is no actual controversy between any of the parties to the suit.

STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

In addition to those statutes and rules cited by Petitioner in its brief, all three questions require consideration of Rule 19, Revised Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States. The third question also requires consideration of Seattle Ordinance 102562, Section 5, as amended by Seattle Ordinance 103422, Section 4, in addition to 29 U.S.C. Section 185, 28 U.S.C. Section 2201, and Article III, Section 2, United States Constitution. The relevant statutes, rules and constitutional provisions involved are set forth at pages A-1-A-7, *infra*.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This Respondent, The City of Seattle, Office of Women's Rights, does not take issue with the facts recited in Petitioner's Statement of the Case. In addition to those facts recited, however, it is important to note that, although a "Directors Charge (R. 42)", a complaint stating various allegations, has been filed by Respondent Office of Women's Rights, no findings of fact whatsoever have been made

regarding the charge and no finding has been made that an unfair practice has been or is being committed by Petitioner. Such findings are required by Seattle Ordinance 102562, Section 5(C), as amended by Seattle Ordinance 103422, Section 4 (*infra*, p. A-5) before any administrative action can be taken against Petitioner and before any actual controversy can arise between this Respondent and Petitioner.

ARGUMENT

I. Respondent Office of Women's Rights, without waiver of any right to present argument in future proceedings, presently takes no position on the two questions regarding procedural requirements in the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Those questions do not relate to the primary, and overriding, issue of jurisdiction herein. This Respondent would only submit that, in view of the lack of jurisdiction herein, there are no "special and important reasons" for granting a writ of certiorari based upon procedural considerations. (Supreme Court Rule 19, *infra*, p. A-2).

II. Petitioner asserts federal subject matter jurisdiction under Section 301 of the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. Sec. 185a). However, both Article III of the United States Constitution, *infra*, p. A-1, and 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2201, Declaratory Judgment Act, require the existence of an actual controversy between the parties. For purposes of determining jurisdiction under Section 301, the parties in question are those parties to the contract in dispute: Petitioner and Respondents Allied Employers and Safeway. (None of the various agencies named as defendant-respondents had or have any direct relationship with the labor agreement in question.) The threshold issue then is

whether as between Petitioner and the employers, an actual case or controversy exists. None of these parties can readily assert the invalidity of a contract negotiated by them and for which they are potentially liable to the employees affected thereby; no party to the agreement who is also a party here, occupies the necessary adverse position contemplated by the Constitution and the Declaratory Judgment Act.

Reliance upon Section 301 of the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. Sec. 185(a)) as the foundation of Petitioner's claim of federal court subject matter jurisdiction is misplaced. Section 301(a) provides as follows:

"Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties." (29 U.S.C. Sec. 185(a)).

It should be clear that the intent of that language was to allow for access to the federal courts when a party to the contract feels there has been a breach of some clause in the contract. The Petitioner is not claiming any violation of the negotiated contract between itself and respondent-employers. Its claim is based on potential duplications of federal, state, and local administrative proceedings.

Petitioner has conceded in its brief (Pet. Br. p. 11) that no case or controversy exists as to Respondent NLRB or Respondent Washington State Human Rights Commission. Respondent Office of Women's Rights has filed a complaint against Petitioner; however, it does not present a threat to

Petitioner. The only action the Office of Women's Rights has taken regarding this complaint is to notify Petitioner of its existence and to serve interrogatories relating to the allegations therein. Petitioner declined to answer the interrogatories and the Office of Women's Rights has taken no further action whatsoever.

It is possible that had the Office of Women's Rights pursued this investigation, there would have been a finding of "no reasonable cause" for the complaint. However, no investigation has commenced and if it does Petitioner may raise any defenses or issues during the course of the administrative proceedings. It is also possible that a conciliation agreement could be reached between Petitioner and the Office of Women's Rights, thereby concluding the matter far short of any formal administrative hearing action (Seattle Ordinance 102562, Section 5(C), (D), and (E), as amended, *infra*, p. A-5). Such a pre-investigation situation has been considered in Moore's *Federal Practice* in regard to standing to sue:

"... The question as to whether the mere threat of enforcement by the agency confers such standing is akin to the question of whether a controversy exists between the plaintiff and defendant in cases in which pre-enforcement relief is sought against prosecution under an allegedly invalid statute. When the rule may or may not be enforced against the plaintiff, and the plaintiff is subjected to no detriment in the meanwhile, and any issues that he may wish to raise in connection with enforcement can be raised in the enforcement proceeding and will in due course reach the courts upon review, the plaintiff may not anticipate the controversy by seeking declaratory relief..." (6A Moore's *Federal Practice*, Section 57.16, p. 57).

Petitioner's action in Federal District Court was premature, as it wished the court to pass upon the structural integrity of the contract before any of the parties took a definite position on that issue. The respondent-employers certainly were not challenging the structural integrity of the contract as they were one of the parties bound by it. The Office of Women's Rights had no position on the issue and no adverse interest is created by merely joining that office as a defendant.

Nor is a case or controversy created by use of the Declaratory Judgment Act (28 U.S.C. Sec. 2201), for:

"The requirements for a justiciable case or controversy are no less strict in a declaratory judgment proceeding than in any other type of suit. . . . This court is without power to give advisory opinions. . . . It has long been its considered practice not to decide abstract, hypothetical or contingent questions. . . ." *Alabama Federation of Labor v. McAdory*, 325 U.S. 450 at 461, 89 L.Ed. 725 (1945).

Likewise:

". . . [T]he Declaratory Judgment Act is only procedural in its operation. It permits courts to grant relief only in cases within their jurisdiction, i.e., cases and controversies under Article III, § 2 of the Constitution of the United States. Thus, by the Act, Congress merely enlarged the remedies available in the federal courts but not the jurisdiction of the court itself." *Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company v. Borden Company*, 241 F.Supp. 683 at 689 (1965).

Therefore, the requisite adversity of interests among the parties which will assure active participation because of immediate threat of injury to legal rights, is missing. See *Baird v. Bellotti*, 393 F.Supp. 847 (1975).

The decision of the Third Circuit in *Jersey Central Power v. IBEW*, 508 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1975), cert pending, docket 75-182, relied upon by Petitioner (Pet. Br. pp. 10-11) is distinguishable. The employer, Jersey Central, had separate and inconsistent contracts with the respondent unions and the respondent EEOC, both of which purported to control the procedure to be followed in lay-offs. The court accepted jurisdiction on the basis that the employer was bound by two inconsistent contracts, and the other two contracting parties had announced their intentions to require the employer to comply with their respective contracts. Jurisdiction over the EEOC in the *Jersey Central* case was predicated upon "arising under" jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331, or alternatively ancillary jurisdiction given Section 301 jurisdiction over the unions and the employer. Adversity of the EEOC was not considered in the court's analysis of whether a justiciable controversy existed.

The *Jersey Central* case had matured to the point where the judicial function could be exercised in resolving an immediate and real dispute. The instant case does not approach maturity. In order for *Jersey Central* to be controlling here, one of the agencies would have to have at least made a finding or to have taken a clear position adverse to Petitioner's interest which would present a concrete issue for settlement. The Office of Women's Rights has certainly not adopted any position adverse to Petitioner and there is no evidence that the EEOC has taken any position whatsoever.

A decision by the Federal District Court on Petitioner's action would be merely advisory and would prevent the

Office of Women's Rights from following its investigative and administrative procedures. The anxiety of petitioner as to any imagined threat is not the type of genuine or real danger to a legal interest which the courts require for a case or controversy.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

JOHN P. HARRIS
Corporation Counsel
Attorney for Respondent
The City of Seattle
Office of Women's Rights

APPENDIX A

STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

*United States Constitution, Article III,
Section 2, Clause 1:*

"Section 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between two or more States;—between a State and Citizens of another State;—between Citizens of different States;—between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects."

Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2201:

"In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, except with respect to Federal taxes, any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such."

*National Labor Relations Act, as amended,
Section 301, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185:*

"(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties."

"(b) Any labor organization which represents employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act and any employer whose activities affect commerce as defined in this Act shall be bound by the acts of its agents. Any such labor organization may sue as an entity and in behalf of the employees whom it represents in the courts of the United States. Any money judgment against a labor organization in a district court of the United States shall be enforceable only against the organization as an entity and against its assets, and shall not be enforceable against any individual member or his assets.

"(c) For the purposes of actions and proceedings by or against labor organizations in the district courts of the United States, district courts shall be deemed to have jurisdiction of a labor organization (1) in the district in which such organization maintains its principal offices, or (2) in any district in which its duly authorized officers or agents are engaged in representing or acting for employee members.

"(d) The service of summons, subpoena, or other legal process of any court of the United States upon an officer or agent of a labor organization, in his capacity as such, shall constitute service upon the labor organization.

"(e) For the purposes of this section, in determining whether any person is acting as an "agent" of another person so as to make such other person responsible for his acts, the question of whether the specific acts performed were actually authorized or subsequently ratified shall not be controlling."

United States Supreme Court Rule 19, 28 U.S.C.

"1. A review on writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only where there are special and important reasons therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring the court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons which will be considered:

"(a) Where a state court has decided a federal question of substance not theretofore determined by this court, or has decided it in a way probably not in accord with applicable decisions of this court.

"(b) Where a court of appeals has rendered a decision in conflict with the decision of another court of appeals on the same matter; or has decided an important state or territorial question in a way in conflict with applicable state or territorial law; or has decided an important question of federal law which has not been, but should be, settled by this court; or has decided a federal question in a way in conflict with applicable decisions of this court; or has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court, as to call for an exercise of this court's power of supervision.

"2. The same general considerations outlined above will control in respect of petitions for writs of certiorari to review judgments of the Court of Claims, of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, or of any other court whose determinations are by law reviewable on writ of certiorari."

*Seattle Ordinance 102562, Section 5, as amended by
Seattle Ordinance 103422, Section 4:*

"Section 5. ENFORCEMENT.

"(A) A complaint alleging an unfair employment practice shall be in writing and signed by the charging party, describing the unfair employment practice complained of and must be filed within six months of the occurrence of the alleged unfair employment practice by:

"(1) Any person, or the person's attorney, when the person claims to be aggrieved by an unfair employment practice.

"(2) Any Commission or Director as defined in Section 3 of this ordinance whenever any such Commission or Director has reason to believe that any person has been engaged or is engaging in an unfair employment practice.

A-4

"(3) A State or Federal agency concerned with discrimination in employment whenever any such agency has reason to believe that an unfair employment practice has been or is being committed.

"(4) Any labor organization which has reason to believe that an unfair employment practice has been or is being committed.

"Complaints pertaining solely to race, color, creed, religion, ancestry, national origin, or political ideology shall be filed with the Department of Human Rights which shall have primary enforcement responsibility with respect thereto; complaints pertaining solely to sex, marital status or sexual orientation shall be filed with the Office of Women's Rights which shall have primary enforcement responsibility with respect thereto; and complaints pertaining solely to age *or sensory, mental or physical handicaps* shall be filed with the *Department of Human Resources*, which shall have primary enforcement responsibility with respect thereto; provided that a complaint alleging more than one or a combination of such factors may be filed with the department or division having jurisdiction over any one of such factors. In such case the receiving Office, Division or Department shall, promptly and before investigation, notify any other Office, Division or Department wherein the complaint could have been filed that the complaint has been received and provide a copy thereof upon request.

"(B) A complaint shall not be rejected as insufficient because of failure to include all required information so long as it substantially satisfies the informational requirements necessary for processing. The charging party may amend a complaint in any respect before notice of hearing on the matter and thereafter may amend the complaint only with permission of the hearing examiner which permission shall be granted when justice will be served thereby and all parties are allowed time to prepare their case with respect to additional or expanded charges which they did not and could not have reasonably foreseen would be in issue at the hearing.

A-5

"(C) After the filing of a complaint, the Director or in case of joint enforcement responsibility, the Director of Human Rights, jointly with the Director of the Office of Women's Rights *and/or Director of the Department of Human Resources*, as the complaint requires, shall promptly refer for investigation and ascertainment of the facts. The results of the investigation shall be reduced to written findings of fact, and a finding shall be made that there is or is not reasonable cause for believing that an unfair practice has been or is being committed.

"(D) If the finding is made that there is no reasonable cause, said finding shall be furnished to the charging party and to the respondent. Within thirty days after receipt of the finding, the charging party shall have the right to appeal such finding to the commission having hearing responsibility by filing a written statement of appeal with it. In the event that no appeal is taken or such appeal is unsuccessful, the complaint shall be dismissed.

"(E) If the finding is made initially or on appeal that reasonable cause exists to believe that an unfair employment practice has occurred, the Director shall endeavor to eliminate the unfair practice by conference, conciliation and persuasion which may include as a condition of settlement the elimination of the unfair employment practice, hiring, reinstatement or upgrading with or without back pay, admittance or restoration to membership in a labor organization, admittance to participation in a guidance apprentice-training or retraining program, or such other requirements as may lawfully be agreed upon by the parties, and the Director. Any settlement agreement shall be reduced to writing and signed by the respondent. An order shall then be entered by the Director setting forth the terms of the agreement. Copies of such order shall be delivered to all affected parties and the original thereof filed with the City Clerk. If no agreement can be reached, a finding to that effect shall be made and reduced to writing with a copy thereof furnished to the charging party and the respondent.

A-6

"(F) In case of failure to reach an agreement for the elimination of such unfair practice, and upon the entry of a finding to that effect, the complaint and any and all findings made, shall be certified by the Director to the appropriate Commission(s) for hearing. The Director shall then cause to be issued and served in the name of the Commission or Commissions having hearing responsibility written notice of hearing to all parties as provided by law.

"The hearing shall be conducted by a hearing examiner from the office of Hearing Examiner, if available, or otherwise by a hearing examiner appointed by the Director from staff, the Commission, or such other persons as the Director may find qualified. The hearing examiner shall conduct the hearing according to such rules as may be adopted therefor by the Director of Human Rights jointly with the Director of the Office of Women's Rights and the Director of the Department of Human Resources, consistent with this ordinance and the Seattle Administrative Code.

"The President of the Commission, or where joint enforcement responsibility is involved, the President of the Human Rights Commission jointly with the President of the Women's Commission, *Chairmen of the Mayor's Committee on Opportunities for the Handicapped*, and/or the President of the Technical Advisory Committee on Aging as the case requires, shall appoint a hearing panel of not more than three Commissioners or persons acting in the name of the Commission with the majority determined by the nature of the complaint, who shall represent the Commission(s) at the hearing.

"The final decision after hearing shall be made by the hearing panel, within 30 days after receipt of and upon full consideration of the report and recommendations of the hearing examiner, as provided in the Seattle Administrative Code.

"(G) In the event the hearing panel shall determine that respondent has been engaged in or is engaged in any unfair employment practice, the hearing panel

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shall issue, in the name of the Commission, and cause to be served on the respondent an order setting forth its decision and reasons therefor and requiring the respondent to cease and desist from such unfair practice or practices and to take such affirmative action, including but not limited to, hiring, reinstatement or upgrading with or without back pay, admit or restore to membership in a labor organization, admit to participation in a guidance, apprentice training or retraining program, or to take such other action as, in the judgment of the hearing panel will effectuate the purposes of this ordinance which may include a requirement for report on the matter of compliance.

"(H) In the event the respondent refuses or fails to comply with any order of a Director or hearing panel, the Director of the department having primary enforcement responsibility shall certify the case and the entire record of its proceedings to the Corporation Counsel, who shall invoke the aid of the appropriate court to secure enforcement or compliance with the order, or to impose a civil penalty as set forth in Section 6, or both; provided, that in any case in which the order is directed to the City, or to any department, division, board, or agency thereof, a copy of such order shall be transmitted to the Mayor who shall take appropriate action to secure compliance therewith.

"(I) The Department, the Office of Women's Rights and the Department of Human Resources, in the performance of their functions, may enlist the aid of all departments of the city government, and all said departments are hereby directed to fully cooperate therewith.

"(J) The Department of Human Rights, the Office of Women's Rights and the Department of Human Resources, in carrying out the specific duties imposed by this ordinance, may request the aid of the City Council through its proper committee in the conduct of any further investigation and enforcement."